University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 15

Issue 2

Article 5

2003

Liability for the Death of a Fetus: Fetal Rights or Women's Rights?
Lori K. Mans

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp

Recommended Citation
Mans, Lori K. (2003) "Liability for the Death of a Fetus: Fetal Rights or Women's Rights?," University of
Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 15: Iss. 2, Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol15/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

NOTES
LIABILITY FOR THE DEATH OF A FETUS: FETAL RIGHTS OR
WOMEN'S RIGHTS?*
Lori K Mans**
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................
II.

296

DEVELOPMENT OF FETAL RIGHTS - STATE

FETICIDE LEGISLATION .................................

A. Feticide B. Feticide C. Feticide D. Feticide III. FEDERAL

States with No Viability Requirement ..........
States with the "Quickness" Requirement .......
States with the Viability Requirement ..........
Variationsin Penaltiesfrom State to State ......

300
301
302
302
303

LEGISLATION - UNBORN VICTIMS OF

VIOLENCE ACT .......................................

303

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF TORT RECOVERY FOR THE
DEATH OF THE FETUS ..................................

A. Transformationof the Common Law Theory in the
UnitedStates ......................................
B. Wrongful Death of a Fetus - Broad Recognition of Recovery
Where Viability is Not Controlling .....................
C. Wrongful Death of a Fetus - Limited Recognition of
Recovery Where Viability is a Requirement ..............
D. Wrongful Death of a Fetus - No Recognition of Recovery
Despite Viability ...................................

305

305
306
307
308

V. "FETAL

RIGHTS" LEGISLATION CONSIDERATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS ......................

309

A. The Debate - "FetalRights" Versus "Women's Rights" ... 309

* Editor's Note: This Note received the Barbara W. Makar Writing Award for the
outstanding Note of Fall 2003.
** B.A. Political Science, B.A. International Studies, 2001, University ofNorth Florida. J.D.
University of Florida expected December 2004. This Note is dedicated to my husband, Jeff, and
to my families - the old and the new.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAWAND PUBLIC POLICY

B. "FetalRights" Legislation - A Challenge to a Woman's
Right to Abortion? ..................................
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................

[Vol. 15

310
311

I. INTRODUCTION

Last spring, prosecutors in California announced that they would
charge Scott Peterson with the murder of both his wife, Laci Peterson, and
their unborn son.' California, like many other states, has a state fetal
homicide law, which makes the killing of an unborn child a separate
offense from killing or injuring the mother.2 Meanwhile, a federal law, the
Unborn Victims of Violence Act,3 was renamed after the Peterson
victims.' The new legislation creates a separate offense for anyone
harming or killing a fetus while committing a federal crime against a
pregnant woman.' Five years after it was first proposed, the bill cleared the
Senate on a 61-38 vote on March 25, 2004.6
A separate but related issue in Florida has also drawn recent national
attention. Governor Jeb Bush and the state's child protection agency
recently urged an Orange County Circuit Judge to appoint a separate
guardian for the fetus of a mentally retarded rape victim.' In defense of the
request, Governor Bush cited the uniqueness ofthe situation.' The twentytwo year old woman is severely incapacitated, and was six months
pregnant at the time of the state's involvement.' According to the

1. Anthony Colarossi, "FetalRights" Renews Old Feud; Some Worry That the Fight Over
a Guardianfor a Fetus Will Erode Abortion Rights, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 9, 2003, at Al.
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2003) (defining murder as "the unlawful killing
of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought").
3. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, H.R. 1997, 108th Cong. § 1841 (2003).
4. Jeffrey Rosen, A Viable Solution, LEGAL AFFAMS, Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 20.
5. See H.R. 1997.
6. U.S. Senate PassesFetus Protection Bill, WOMEN'S HEALTH WKLY., Apr. 15, 2004, at
78; Michael Holzapfel, The Right to Live, the Right to Choose, andthe Unborn Victims of Violence
Act, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 431, 434 (2002); see also H.R. 1997.
7. Colarossi, supra note 1, at Al. Governor Bush recently took this a step further with a
request that the state legislature allow appointment of guardians for fetuses of incapacitated women.
Keep Jeb Out of Womb, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 30, 2004, at 12A. At the governor's request, the
House is currently drafting such a bill. Bob Mahlburg, CriticsStall Feeding Tube Bill State House
PanelPostpones Outgrowth of "Terri'sLaw," ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 4, 2004, at B 1.
8. Colarossi, supra note 1, at Al.
9. Id.
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Governor, because the woman's fetus was likely capable of living outside
of the womb, the state had a compelling interest in protecting it.
As a result of these legal measures, advocates of abortion rights are
concerned that the landmark Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade,"
which established a woman's right to have an abortion," is under attack. 3
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court recognized that a woman's right to
privacy encompassed the right to have an abortion. 4 In 1973, the Court
was persuaded that the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, did not extend to the unborn.'" Yet, acknowledging the level
of debate surrounding the issue, the Court refused to "resolve the difficult
question of when life begins."' 6 Importantly, the Court noted that the
woman's right to privacy was not absolute. 7 It emphasized that the state
has an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the
health of pregnant women and "in protecting potential life."'" According
to the Supreme Court, the state's interest became compelling at the end of
the first trimester. 9 Significantly, the Court further explained that the
state's interests in the health of the mother and the "potential life" were
separate and distinct.2" Thus, while Roe v. Wade established a woman's
right to an abortion, the Court's decision also set the stage for an extensive
national debate over fetal personhood.2"
By the end of the 1980s concerns arose as to whether the decision in
Roe v. Wade could withstand the change in the composition of the

10. JEAN REITH SCHROEDEL, Is THE FETUS A PERSON? A COMPARISON OF POLICIES AcRoss
THE FIFTY STATES 46-47

(2000) (explaining that the point of viability is generally between twentyfour and twenty-six weeks); see alsoRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154, 163-64(1973); Rosen, supra
note 4, at 20.
11. See generally Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
12. Id. at 154.
13. Rosen, supra note 4, at 20.
14. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
15. Id. at 158.
16. Id. at 159.
17. Id. at 154.
18. Id.
19. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
20. Id. at 154.
21. In its discussion of the evolution ofthoughts on when life begins, the Court contemplated
the relevance ofthis question to the abortion debate. Id.at 129-34. Yet, by setting the question aside
and instead developing the abortion right as a balancing of interests between the woman and the
state, the Court left open the question of fetal personhood. See generally SCHROEDEL, supra note
10, at 46-47; ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 745-46 (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds.,
2001).
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Supreme Court.22 In 1989, the Supreme Court's decision in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services23 gave further substance to these
speculations about the future of abortion law.24 Without a majority
opinion, the Court upheld a Missouri law that declared the state's view that
life begins at conception. Notably, Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion
in Webster, which was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
cautioned, "For today, at least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed ....
But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows."26
Three years later, with Justices Brennan and Marshall replaced, there
was a possibility that Roe v. Wade could be overruled when Planned
Parenthoodv.Casey" was before the Court.2 Although the Court in Casey
overruled the trimester framework and the strict scrutiny standard
established by Roe v. Wade, it affirmed the more fundamental aspects of
Roe v. Wade. 29 The Casey Court recognized a woman's right to choose to
have an abortion before viability, as well as the state's limited power to
restrict abortions after viability. Most significantly, the decision reiterated
the state's legitimate interest from the "outset of the pregnancy in
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may
become a child., 30 Thus, the Court protected the central right recognized
by Roe v. Wade while also validating the state's interest in potential life.
Although some feticide legislation specifically exempts abortion from
its coverage, 3' pro-choice activists fear a legal trend that moves closer to
defining the fetus as a person.32 Similarly, while Governor Jeb Bush relied
22. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 21, at 745-46.
23. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
24. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 746.
25. Id. at 745-46.
26. Webster, 492 U.S. at 560 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explicating concerns over the
majority's analysis and the future of Roe's holding).
27. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1994).
28. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 747.
29. Id. (summarizing the effect of Casey, 505 U.S. 833).
30. Casey, 505 U.S. at 834.

31. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 4, at 21 (discussing a Minnesota law that explicitly
recognizes a woman's right to abort a fetus before viability); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-1.1
(2003) (exempting the fetal homicide statute from acts committed during any abortion, lawful or
unlawful, to which the pregnant woman consented).
32. See Rosen, supra note 4, at 20. Pro-choice supporters fear the Unborn Victims of
Violence Act would suggest that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception. Id.See also
Tara Kole & Laura Kadetsky, The Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 215
(2002) (describing the view that the Unborn Victims of Violence Act gives the fetus human status
and infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to choose an abortion); Holzapfel, supra note 6,
at 439 (discussing the positions of various opponents to fetal protection legislation); Alison Tsao,
Note, Fetal Homicide Laws: Shield Against Domestic Violence or Sword to Pierce Abortion
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upon the special circumstances of the Florida case to justify the
appointment of a fetal guardian,33 if this action is successful, it would
arguably establish a precedent in support of the broader proposition that a
fetus is a person with rights separate and distinct from the mother's.34
Conceivably, this could undermine Roe v. Wade and a woman's right to
abortion by making every abortion an act of homicide.35
The Court's decision in Casey may be interpreted to mean that a fetus
is not a person only within the context of the Fourteenth Amendment.36
Thus some legal scholars contend that there is no tension between fetal
homicide laws and Roe v. Wade.37 In fact, others argue that these laws in
fact strengthen, rather than threaten, the rights of women.38 Indeed, it is
possible to interpret feticide legislation as protecting the individual
autonomy of the woman who chooses to have a baby. It is far from radical
to say that third parties who harm or kill an unborn fetus are intruding upon
a woman's right to choose by eliminating the possibility of that choice. In
this respect, feticide legislation is arguably a champion of Roe v. Wade and
of women's rights. Yet, even this argument is vulnerable. It is difficult to
justify feticide legislation as a defender of Roe v. Wade in light of the wide
ranging definitions of a "fetus" among state feticide statutes.39 Unclear
rhetoric and a lack of consensus in this regard promises further
complication in the national debate over fetal personhood.
In Part II, this Note traces the development of fetal rights, examining
various state feticide laws. Part II.A will address state laws that impose
criminal liability for the death of a fetus at any stage in its development.
Parts II.B and II.C will address state laws that require a fetus to be "quick,"
and others that require a fetus to be viable in order to impose liability. Part
II.D will compare the various criminal penalties that each state imposes for
the death of a fetus. Similarly, Part III of this Note will assess the recently
passed federal feticide legislation, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act.
Part IV will examine the development of fetal rights in the context of tort

Rights?, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 459 (1998) (presenting the argument that fetal protection
laws are inconsistent with Roe).
33. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
34. Colarossi, supra note 1, at Al.

35. Tsao, supra note 32, at 459.
36. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
37. Rosen, supra note 4, at 22. See also Tsao, supra note 32, at 459 (recognizing that fetal
homicide statutes are not necessarily inconsistent with the holding of Roe).
38. Rosen, supra note 4, at 22; Kole & Kadetsky, supra note 32, at 227 (suggesting that the

Unborn Victims of Violence Act and similar state feticide statutes strengthen, rather than threaten,
a woman's right to choose to have an abortion).
39. See discussion, infra Parts II & Il1.
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recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus. Part IV.A will trace the
transformation of the U.S. common law theory regarding wrongful death
of the fetus, which in many ways parallels the development of feticide
legislation in the United States. Parts IV.B and IV.C will set forth the
various gestational age requirements to state a cause of action for the
wrongful death of the fetus, while Part IV.D will address those states that
do not allow such a cause of action regardless of the fetus's gestational
age. Part V of this Note considers the range of implications that arise from
various "fetal rights" legislation. Part VI predicts the path of this debate
and proposes solutions to the perplexing issue of liability for the death of
a fetus.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF FETAL RIGHTS - STATE FETICIDE LEGISLATION
Under the common law, the killing of a fetus could only constitute
homicide if there was first a live birth.4" The "born alive" rule only
bestowed a separate legal status to the fetus if it was born alive, and later
died of injuries inflicted upon it while in the womb.4 This rule stemmed
largely from the unsophisticated state of medical technology.42 Not only
was it difficult to determine whether a fetus was alive in the womb, but it
was also difficult to determine the time and cause of a fetus's death.43
Without this rule, it would have been difficult to establish the required
causal connection between the death of a fetus and a third party's
conduct.44 Following independence, the "born alive" rule was adopted into
the United States legal system and some states continue to adhere to the
rule when interpreting criminal liability for harm caused to a fetus.45
A large number of states have abandoned the traditional common law
approach in favor of broader criminal liability for fetal harm. More than
half of the states have some form of fetal homicide legislation, which

40. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50

(1817).
41. Tsao, supra note 32, at 460 (citing Katherine Folger, Note, When Does Life Begin or
End? The CaliforniaSupreme CourtRedefines FetalMurder in People v. Davis, 29 U.S.F. L. REV.
237, 239 (1994)).
42. Id. at 460-61.
43. Id.
44. Id. Given the primitive state of technology during the time this theory was advanced,
doctors were not able to accurately determine the cause of death of a fetus. Id. In effect, a
prosecutor was left with little proof that a party caused the death of the fetus unless the fetus was
first born alive. Id.
45. Id. at 460-61.

LIABILITY FOR THE DEATH OF A FETUS: FETAL RIGHTS OR WOMEN'S RIGHTS?

punishes third parties for inflicting harm upon a fetus.46 Feticide statutes
generally require the termination of a human pregnancy and a lack of
consent by the pregnant woman.47 Notably, abortions are beyond the reach
of these statutes because of the woman's consent. Yet, states differ in the
degree of protection they provide to the fetus.4
A. Feticide - States with No Viability Requirement
The gestational age covered by feticide statutes varies from state to
state. Several states have fetal homicide statutes that do not differentiate
between different periods of pre-natal development. These states punish
third parties for killing a fetus at any stage of development." Most of these
statutes refer to the fetus as an "unborn child,"52 while Idaho's feticide
statute uses the terms "human embryo or fetus."53 Texas recently passed
the Prenatal Protection Act, which extended the entire criminal code to "an
'5 4
unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth.
Arguably, it is possible that these statutes could impose criminal liability
for the killing of a pre-embryonic zygote."

46. See discussion, infra Parts II.A-C.
47. Tsao, supra note 32, at 462.
48. SCHROEDEL, supra note 10, at 128-30; see also discussion, infra Parts II.A-C.
49. SCHROEDEL, supra note 10, at 129-30.
50. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1103 (2003) (making it manslaughter to knowingly or
recklessly cause the death of an unborn child by physical injury to the mother which would be
murder if the death of the mother had occurred); 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. § 5/9-1.2 (2004) (outlining
the elements of intentional homicide of an unborn child); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.5 (2002)
(criminalizing the killing of an unborn child).
51. See supra text accompanying note 50.
52. See supra text accompanying note 50.
53. IDAHO CODE §§ 18-4001, 18-4006 (2003).

54. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.001(3) (Vernon 2004); 2003 Tex. Gen.
Laws 822.
55. Rosen, supra note 4, at 22.
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B. Feticide - States with the "Quickness" Requirement
Several states include a "quickness" requirement in their statutes.5 6
These statutes punish third parties for killing a fetus only if it has reached
the point of "quickening." 5 A "quick" fetus is one whose movement in the
womb can be felt. 8 In this regard, many of the states use specific language
to identify the child as an "unborn quick child."5 9 In California, the killing
of an unborn child after the embryonic stage is murder.6 0 Arkansas's statute
is even more explicit. It attaches criminal liability to the killing of an
unborn child of twelve weeks or greater gestation.6 '
C. Feticide - States with the Viability Requirement
The final category of fetal homicide statutes includes those that require
viability in order for the fetus to be considered a legal victim of a thirdparty killing. In Florida, the vehicular homicide statute requires the
killing of a viable fetus in order to find liability.6 While several other
56. See, e.g. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37(1) (2004) (criminalizing "the willful killing of an
unborn quick child, by an injury to the mother... which would be murder if it resulted in the death
of the mother"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 200.210 (2003) ("a person who willfully kills an unborn

quick child" by injury to the mother is guilty of manslaughter); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 713
(2004) (criminalizing the "willfull killing of an unborn quick child"); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80
(2002) (stating that "a person commits the offense of feticide if he willfully kills an unborn child
so far developed as to be ordinarily called 'quick').
57. See supra text accompanying note 56.

58. SCHROEDEL, supra note 10, at 130. Quickening usually occurs at a gestational age of
sixteen to twenty weeks. Id.

59. See supra text accompanying note 56.
60. See supratext accompanying note 56; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (2003). The statute
states that "murder is the unlawful killing of a human being or fetus with malice aforethought," but
does not define "fetus." Id. The term "fetus" means an unborn child from eight weeks until birth,

as distinguished from the earlier embryo. MOSBY'S

MEDICAL,

NURSINo & ALLIED HEALTH

DICTIONARY 622 (5th ed. 1998).
61. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(B)(l)(a) (Michie 2004). Section 5-10-101 is Arkansas's
capital murder provision. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 (Michie 2003). Section 5-10-105 is
Arkansas's negligent homicide statute. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-105 (Michie 2003). This
section states, "[flor the purposes of §§ 5-10-101 - 5-10-105, 'person' also includes an unborn
child in utero at any stage of development; 'unborn child' means a living fetus of twelve (12) weeks
or greater gestation." Id.
62. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1(4) (2003) (stating that "a person who...
knowingly or intentionally kills a fetus that has attained viability ... commits murder."). Viability
is defined as "the ability of a fetus to live outside the mother's womb." IND. CODE ANN. § 16-18-2365 (2004).
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.071 (2003) (stating that vehicular homicide includes "the killing

of a viable fetus by any injury to the mother," caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by another
in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another). But see FLA.
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states have created criminal statutes that apply to the fetus, several courts
have interpreted the term "person" in these statutes to include a viable
fetus.' In these states, the ability of a fetus to exist separately from its
mother is key to its protection under feticide statutes.
D. Feticide - Variations in Penaltiesfrom State to State
Feticide statutes vary in the severity of punishment they impose for
killing an unborn child as well. 5 Some states impose a maximum sentence
of ten years, while others provide a maximum sentence of life in prison.66
A handful of states have included fetuses in their murder statutes, thereby
treating the killing of a fetus identically to the killing of a born person.67
For example, in Utah, the killing of an unborn child at any stage of prenatal development is treated as any other homicide.6" Other states separate
provisions pertaining to fetal killings from those pertaining to born
persons.69 These states usually impose a less severe punishment for the
killing of a fetus than would be imposed for the killing of a born person.
LI. FEDERAL LEGISLATION - UNBORN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE ACT

First introduced in 1999, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act
represents the federal government's effort to establish its own feticide

§ 782.09 (2003) (stating that "[tihe willful killing of an unborn quick child, by any
injury to the mother of such child which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother,
shall be deemed manslaughter," a felony of the second degree).
64. SCHROEDEL, supra note 10, at 128-33. In Massachusetts and South Carolina courts have
found that individuals who kill a viable fetus can be charged with murder. Id. at 133 (citing
Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 378 (1989), State v. Home, 282 S.C. 444 (1984), and
Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799 (1984)).
65. Id. at 129; compare MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37(1) (2004) (providing that the willful
killing of an unborn quick child is manslaughter), with GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80(b) (2003)
(providing that a person who kills an unborn quick child commits the crime of feticide punishable
by life in prison).
66. SCHROEDEL, supra note 10, at 129. Compare NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. 200.210 (Michie
2004) (providing a maximum often years for the killing of a unborn quick child) with GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-5-80 (2003) (providing that a person convicted of killing an unborn quick child shall be
punished by imprisonment for life).
67. See, e.g., TEX. CIrv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.001(3) & 71.002 (Vernon 2004)
(applying the entire criminal code to the killing of an unborn child).
68. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(l)(a) (2003).
69. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (2003) (providing a separate and distinct provision
relating to feticide).
STAT. ANN.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 15

legislation.7" The Act amends the federal criminal code and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice to create a separate offense for the killing or
injuring of a fetus during the commission of certain federal crimes.7" It is
the first federal law to impose a separate offense for causing the death or
injury of the fetus at any stage of development.72
The Act combines those characteristics of state statutes that afford
some of the broadest protections for the fetus." First, it classifies the fetus
as a "child in utero."'74 The law applies to a "member of the species homo
sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb. 7 5 The
Act further specifies that the term "unborn child" means a "child in
utero."76 Second, the Act explicates that the punishment for the killing or
injuring of an unborn child is "the same as the punishment provided for
that conduct under Federal law had that injury or death occurred to the
' This does not, however, extend to the imposition
unborn child's mother."77
7
of the death penalty. " In addition, the Act specifically exempts from its
coverage conduct relating to a consensual abortion, medical treatment, or
conduct by the pregnant woman with respect to her unborn child.7 9
Although the House passed the bill in 1999 and again in 2001,'° there
was some opposition to its passage. Some representatives expressed
concern that the bill would establish greater fetal rights to the detriment of
women."' The bill languished unsuccessfully in the Senate in both 1999
and 2001.2 This was due in part to the opposition of the Clinton
Administration, which cited the Act as a flawed response to violence

70. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, H.R. 1997, 108th Cong. § 1841 (2003); see
Kole & Kadetsky, supra note 32, at 218.
71. Kole & Kadetsky, supra note 32, at 215.
72. Id. at 218.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 74-77.
74. H.R. 1997, 108th Cong. § 1841 (2003).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, § 1841.
80. Holzapfel, supra note 6, at 434.
81. Unborn Victims of ViolenceAct of1999: Hearingon HR. 2436Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 12-15 (1999) (statements of
Rep. Conyers and Rep. Nadler) (stating that the bill may expand fetal rights in a way that would
conflict with the rights of women, and expressing the belief that the purpose of the bill is to
undermine a woman's right to choose).
82. Holzapfel, supra note 6, at 437-38.

LIABILITY FOR THE DEATH OF A FETUS: FETAL RIGHTS OR WOMEN S RIGHTS?

against women. 3 The Act was most recently introduced again in 2004.4
Re-named "Laci and Connor's Bill," 5 it passed the Senate in 2004 and was
signed by President George W. Bush on April 1, 2004.6

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF TORT RECOVERY FOR THE DEATH OF THE FETUS
The common law view of feticide was consistent with earlier periods'
views of causes of action for wrongful death of the fetus.8 7 The common
law advanced the "single entity" rule, which considered the unborn child
and its mother as a single entity. 8 There was no basis under the common
law for considering the fetus a "person." 9 Thus, tort law could not
recognize a duty owed to the fetus.9"
A. Transformationof the Common Law Theory in the UnitedStates
The first United States decision to address prenatal injury and wrongful
death was Dietrichv. InhabitantsofNorthampton in 1884. 9' Dietrichboth
reflected and reinforced the well-established common law theory on fetal
tort recovery with highly influential boundaries of fetal tort recovery. In
Dietrich,a woman asserted that the city should be held liable for the death
of her fetus, which she delivered prematurely after she fell as a result of a
defect in the public highway. 92 The child lived for only fifteen minutes.93
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes reasoned that the unborn fetus was a part
of the mother, and because without the mother it had no separate existence,
there was no recovery for the wrongful death of the fetus.94

83. Id. at 437.
84. Rosen, supra note 4, at 20.
85. Id. Although the bill was renamed "Laci and Conner's Law," the Unborn Victims of
Violence Act would not apply in state cases such as this. Id. Rather, it would apply to the killing
of a fetus during the commission of another federal offense. Id.
86. See H.R. 1997, 108th Cong. § 1841 (2003).
87. See SCHROEDEL, supra note 10, at 33.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Dietrich v. Inhabitants ofNorthampton, 138 Mass. 14 (Mass. 1884); SCHROEDEL, supra
note 10, at 33.
92. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 14-15.

93. Id.
94. Id. at 15-16; see also Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., 532 S.E.2d 856, 859-60 (S.C.
2000) (Toal, J., dissenting) (discussing the Dietrich decision).
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Beginning in the 1940s, courts began to abandon the approach of the
Dietrichcourt. 95 Although it did not directly address the permissibility of
recovery for the wrongful death of the fetus, Bonbrest v. Kotz, 96 suggested
a limited basis for the legal standing of a fetus in general tort law. 97 In
Bonbrest, the D.C. District Court strayed significantly from the decision
in Dietrichby affording legal standing to the viable fetus that was injured
but later born alive. 98 Much like the "born alive" rule, which limited the
criminal liability of third parties who killed a fetus, tort recovery for harm
to the fetus was limited to instances in which the fetus was harmed at the
point of viability and later born alive. 99
Today, the subject has been heavily litigated under both state wrongful
death statutes and under the Federal Tort Claims Act."'0 The overwhelming
trend appears to be moving away from the common law doctrine, to a
standard that more liberally recognizes fetal tort recovery.' 0Yet,
the trend
2
has manifested itself in varying degrees from state to state.1
B. Wrongful Death of a Fetus - Broad Recognition of Recovery Where
Viability is Not Controlling
Recognizing that actions for prenatal injuries are permitted almost
universally, many courts have allowed recovery for the death of the
fetus.'0 3 Several states also recognize a cause of action for the death of a

95. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
96. See id.

97. It should be noted that today, nearly all jurisdictions allow tort recovery for prenatal
injuries ifthe fetus is subsequently born alive. Crosby, 532 S.E.2d at 860 (Toal, J., dissenting). This
generally holds true regardless of whether or not the fetus was viable at the time of injury. Id. (Toal,
J., dissenting).

98. See SCHROEDEL, supra note 10, at 33-34.
99. Id.
100. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity when
federal employees are negligent within the scope of their employment. It may come into play when
a government employee or agent is the cause of the death of a fetus. The federal government can
only be sued "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law ofthe place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b)(1) (2003).
101. See Margaret G. Farrell, Revisiting Roe v. Wade: Substance andProcess in the Abortion

Debate, 68 IND. L.J. 269, 303 n.139 (2003).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (2003) (providing for liability for death of an
unborn child). See also Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 790 (S.D. 1996)
(interpreting the term "unborn child" in the state's wrongful death statutes to include a nonviable
fetus).
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fetus whether or not the fetus is viable."' Some of this recognition has
been in the form of judicially created recovery,'! 5 while other recognition
has been through statutorily created remedies.'0 6 For example, South
Dakota's wrongful death statute provides a cause of action for the
wrongful death or injury of a person, "including an unborn child."'0 7 In
Illinois, the relevant statute specifies that a wrongful death action is
permissible irrespective of the gestational stage of the fetus.'08 Notably,
most of the states that do not require viability of the fetus in their wrongful
death statutes are° the same states that do not require viability in their
feticide statutes."
C. Wrongful Death of a Fetus - Limited Recognition of Recovery Where
Viability is a Requirement
Most jurisdictions consider viability to be a controlling factor in
determining whether an action for the wrongful death of a fetus is
sustainable." 0 In some cases, a nonviable fetus is not determined to be a
"person" within the wrongful death statutes."' Similarly, some states
adhere to a "quickness" requirement so that a cause of action may only be
maintained upon a showing that the fetus was quick at the time of death. "2

104. See Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., Inc., 532 S.E.2d 856, 861 (S.C. 2000) (Toal, J.,
dissenting) (discussing Farley v. Sartin, 195 W. Va. 671,683 (W. Va. 1995), which found that the
term "person" as used in wrongful death statutes encompasses a nonviable unborn child).
105. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (2003); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/2-2
(2003) (providing that the state of gestation of a human being shall not foreclose an action for
wrongful death).
106. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (2003).
107. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/2-2 (2003).
108. Compare S.D. CODIFID LAWS § 21-5-1 (2003) (not imposing viability requirement in
the state's wrongful death statute) with S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-1 (2003) (not imposing
viability requirement in the state's homicide statute).
109. 62A AM. JuR. 2D Prenatal § 46 (2003).
110. See, e.g. Fed. Credit Union v. Tucker, 853 So.2d 104 (Miss. 2003) (holding that the term
"person" in the state's wrongful death statute included a fetus that was "quick" in the womb);
Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241 (Ala. 1993) (a nonviable fetus is not a "minor child" as
included in the state's wrongful death statute); Car v. Wittingen, 451 N.W.2d 584 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990) (only a viable fetus is considered to be a "person" for purposes of the state's wrongful death
statute).
111. 62A AM. JuR. 2DPrenatal§ 55 n.69 (2003); see also Tucker, 853 So. 2d at 104 (holding
that a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus exists where the fetus was "quick," or
moving within the mother's womb).
112. See Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., Inc., 532 S.E.2d 856, 859 n.4 (S.C. 2000) (Toal,
J., dissenting) (citing Chatelain v. Kelley, 910 S.W.2d 215 (Ark. 1995)).
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D. Wrongful Death of a Fetus - No Recognition of Recovery
Despite Viability
Despite widespread trends and developments in the area of tort
recovery for injury and death of fetuses, a minority of jurisdictions
continue to deny an action for the wrongful death of an unborn child unless
it is born alive."' In some of these jurisdictions, the rejection of a cause of
action for the prenatal death of a child is based upon the view that the
unborn child is not separate, but is integrally tied to the mother and
therefore has no separate legal existence."' Courts in accord with the
minority view also hold that a cause of action for the death of a fetus is
beyond the legislative intent behind state wrongful death statutes." 5 These
courts are therefore unwilling to construe the word "person" in wrongful
death statutes as encompassing the unborn." 6
Florida is one of the few states that continues to adhere to this
construction."' Florida courts have repeatedly held that a stillborn fetus,
even though previously viable, is not a "person" for which recovery is
allowed under the state's wrongful death act." 8 Courts are firm in their
unwillingness to infringe upon the legislature's prerogative to create rights
and interests." 9 Florida decisions consistently imply that recovery in

113. See Young v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 653 So. 2d 499, 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (Mickle,
J., concurring) (discussing the views of the minority of states).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 119-21. Florida's wrongful death statute states:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, default, or
breach of contract or warranty of any person, including those occurring on
navigable waters, and the event would have entitled the person injured to maintain
an action to recover damages if death had not ensued, the person or watercraft that
would have been liable in damages if death had not ensued shall be liable for
damages as specified in this act notwithstanding the death of the person injured,
although death was caused under circumstances constituting a felony.
§ 768.19 (2003).
117. See, e.g., Simon ex rel. Pope v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Toombs
v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, Inc., 833 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 2002); Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705 (Fla.
1997); Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968).
118. Toombs, 833 So. 2d at 109.
119. See generally Stokes, 213 So. 2d at 700 (citing the intent of the legislature and the
historical background of the State's wrongful death statute as a reason for the disallowance of an
action for wrongful death of a fetus). But see Young v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 653 So. 2d 499,
505-07 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (Mickle, J., concurring) (criticizing courts' reluctance to address a
cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus, and instead leaving it to the legislature).
FLA. STAT. ANN.
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Florida for the death of a fetus will not be permitted unless the legislature
amends the state's wrongful death act, or evidences intent contrary to the
current interpretations of the judiciary. 2 '
V. "FETAL RIGHTS" LEGISLATION - CONSIDERATIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS

Legal measures that reflect upon fetal personhood have sparked
widespread debate from pro-choice and pro-life activists alike.
Inconsistencies between state statutes and recently proposed federal
legislation appear to threaten the fragile holding of Roe v. Wade. In light
of these discontinuities, the question of fetal personhood has remained
convoluted and unresolved.
A. The Debate - "FetalRights" Versus "Women's Rights"
The ever evolving state of so-called "fetal rights" legislation at both the
state and federal levels has left many wondering if it will result in the
abrogation of Roe v. Wade.' Arguably, imposing liability for death of the
fetus through feticide legislation and wrongful death acts establishes the
fetus as a person.' 22 Indeed, if such a determination were made it would
accord the fetus rights separate and distinct from those of the mother,
thereby pitting the interests of the fetus against the rights of the mother.'23
In response to these concerns, it is notable that several statutes
specifically exempt abortion from their reach. In addition, some contend
that "fetal rights" legislation is, in effect, a misnomer for legislation which
actually reinforces a woman's autonomy.'24 While it may appear otherwise,
it is not unreasonable to countenance this assertion. Arguably, these legal
measures reinforce a woman's right to choose whether or not to have a
child.'25 "Fetal rights" legislation, by deterring and punishing those who
take away this choice by killing a fetus, protects the essential holding of
Roe v. Wade.'26 Thus, those on this side of the debate would conceivably
categorize the legislation under the broad heading of "women's rights."

Rosen, supra note 4, at 20.
Colarossi, supra note 1, at Al.
Kole & Kadetsky, supra note 32, at 227-28.
See id.
See id.
See id.
126. See supra discussion in Parts II & III; see also SCHROEDEL, supra note 10, tbl.5.5
(comparing fetal laws across the states).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
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Yet, the strength of this argument is questionable. It is difficult to
reconcile the varying degrees of fetal protection that different states offer
with the idea that "fetal rights" legislation safeguards a woman's right to
choose.' 27 If this was the true legislative intent, the law would likely afford
this protection to a woman regardless of the gestational age of her fetus. If
a party causes the death of a fetus at any stage in its development, the party
has infringed upon the right of the woman to choose to have a child. Most
telling is the dichotomy between Florida's fetal homicide statutes and its
wrongful death statute. 2 While most states grant consistent levels of
protection to the fetus in both the criminal and tort arena, Florida does
not. "29
' It imposes criminal liability for the killing of a "quick," or viable
fetus, but does not allow a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus
at any stage in its development. 3 Furthermore, if feticide statutes and
wrongful death actions truly protected a woman's reproductive autonomy,
their impact would arguably extend further. If a party injures a woman so
that she is no longer able to have children, it is conceivable, although
admittedly bold, that liability would exist for interfering with a woman's
reproductive autonomy, and for preventing her from ever having her
desired children.
B. "FetalRights" Legislation - A Challenge to a Woman's Right
to Abortion?
At this point, it is useful to compare the existing state of "fetal rights"
legislation with the foundational Supreme Court decisions regarding
abortion. 3 ' Those who worry that "fetal rights" legislation will jeopardize
a woman's right to have an abortion by establishing the fetus as a person,
cannot rely solely upon the legislation's inconsistencies with Roe v.
Wade. 32
' In fact, Roe v. Wade explicitly declined to decide the difficult
question of when a fetus becomes a "person."' 33 Instead, the Court limited

127. Compare FLA. STAT. ch. 768.19 (2003) (not providing recovery for wrongful death of
fetus despite viability) with FLA. STAT. ch. 782.071 (2003) (imposing criminal liability for the
killing of a viable fetus) and FLA. STAT. ch. 782.09 (2003) (imposing criminal liability for the
killing of a "quick" fetus).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 21, at 738-58 (discussing Roe v. Wade and Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey as highly influential decisions regarding the right of women to terminate their
pregnancy prior to viability).
131. See infra text accompanying notes 132-34.
132. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
133. Id. at 163.
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its holdings, concluding only that a woman has a right to choose to have
'
an abortion without significant state interference until the third trimester. 34
At this point, the state's interest in protecting the life of the unborn child
becomes compelling, therefore that it may prohibit a woman from
exercising that right.' Concededly, this rhetoric suggests that a fetus
becomes a person deserving of the state's protection at the point of
viability."3 If this, as well as the argument that fetal protection laws are
really about fetal personhood, is accepted, then those laws that establish
are likely to be most in line
liability for the death of a fetus after viability
17
with the reasoning of the Supreme Court.
In both Roe v. Wade and Casey, the Supreme Court recognized the
state's legitimate interest in preserving the "potential life" of the fetus. 3
Indeed, Casey unequivocally stated that this interest arises "from the outset
of pregnancy." ' Thus, it would seem that "fetal rights" legislation is an
accurate exercise of this interest.
VI. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing discussion, and the ongoing and complicated
debate, it is apparent that the language of fetal protection laws is confusing
and inconsistent. As for fetal protection laws, even pro-choice activists
would likely agree that such laws serve a useful purpose. Importantly, the
majority of third party fetal killings are caused by acts of domestic
violence. 4 To a great degree, fetal protection laws seek to punish those
who abuse women. Undoubtedly, few would argue against the virtue of
curbing violence against women. The problem, however, is the unclear
rhetoric and discontinuity in state and federal legislation. ' These
inconsistencies appear to be driven, in part, by views on abortion rather
than a desire to develop a concise policy on protecting potential life and

134. Id.
135. See infra text accompanying note 136.
136. Arguably, the state has a compelling interest in heavily restricting abortions at the point
of viability because it is at this point that the fetus is deemed a "person" within the Fourteenth
Amendment, entitled to the protection of life, liberty and property. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 1.
137. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154(1973); CHEMERINKSY,supranote2l, at 747 (discussing
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1994)).
138. PlannedParenthood,505 U.S. at 833.
139. SCHRoEDEL, supra note 10, at 173.
140. See supra discussion in Parts II-IV.
141. See generally ScHROEDEL, supra note 10, at 188-89.
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the woman who exercises her right to have a child. Legislatures should
take note that a more focused approach to the problems of fetal battering
and third party fetal killings, without reference to abortion, would be useful
in remedying the current state of affairs. Ideally, a less polarized process
would result in fetal protection laws that afford consistent protections to
the fetus at both the state and federal level.

